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Abstract
We quantify the fiscal multipliers in response to the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009. We extend the
benchmark Smets-Wouters (Smets and Wouters, 2007) New Keyne-
sian model, allowing for credit-constrained households, the zero lower
bound, government capital and distortionary taxation. The posterior
yields modestly positive short-run multipliers around 0.52 and mod-
estly negative long-run multipliers around -0.42. The multiplier is
sensitive to the fraction of transfers given to credit-constrained house-
holds, the duration of the zero lower bound and the capital. The
stimulus results in negative welfare effects for unconstrained agents.
The constrained agents gain, if they discount the future substantially.
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“Fiscal Stimulus”, the size of “fiscal multipliers” and the impact of discre-
tionary fiscal spending on GDP and unemployment, has once again become
central to policy debates in wake of the financial crisis of 2008 and fiscal
policy responses in a number of countries. In this paper, we therefore seek to
quantify the size, uncertainty and sensitivity of fiscal multipliers in response
to a “fiscal stimulus” as in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
(ARRA) of 2009 in the United States, using an extension of a benchmark
New Keynesian model.
From a purists’ perspective, this may be the wrong question to ask. Pol-
icy should care about welfare, rather than derivative measures such as GDP
or unemployment. Moreover, it should seek to solve a Mirrlees-Ramsey prob-
lem, and use the best combinations of available tools and taxes to maximize
welfare, subject to constraints imposed by markets and the asymmetry of
information. We do not disagree. Indeed, there is a considerable literature
on these topics. We address welfare issues in section 3.9, but they are not
the main focus of this paper.
Indeed, many public debates focus on the effects of fiscal spending on
GDP and unemployment. Economists have the tools to answer these ques-
tions, and therefore, perhaps they should. Several recent papers have ad-
dressed these issues. This paper seeks to make a contribution to this emerging
literature. In essence, we seek to understand how much of the rather nega-
tive perspective on long-run multipliers in Uhlig (2010b), due to distortionary
taxation in a neoclassical growth model, survives in a model that takes a very
Keynesian perspective. In a nutshell, the answer is: while the benchmark
long-run multiplier is now modestly negative rather than substantially neg-
ative and while the precise answer is sensitive to some key assumptions and
uncertain parameters, much survives indeed.
We view the following elements as important. First, “fiscal stimulus”
takes time in practice, despite calls for immediate actions as in e.g. Spilim-
bergo et al. (2008). The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act or ARRA
(2009) therefore serves as a useful benchmark and example for the speed at
which fiscal policy tools can be deployed, as emphasized by Cogan et al.
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(2010). Second, government expenditures are financed eventually with dis-
tortionary taxes, creating costly disincentive effects, a point emphasized by
Uhlig (2010b). Third, monetary policy and its restrictions due to the zero
lower bound (ZLB) on interest rates can matter substantially for the effec-
tiveness of “fiscal stimulus”, as emphasized by Eggertsson (2010) as well as
Christiano et al. (2009), in particular if there are sticky prices and wages.
Fourth, transfers are a substantial part of the ARRA and similar programs:
the degree to which they are given to credit-constrained households may
matter considerably, see Coenen et al. (2010). Finally, model coefficients
are uncertain and results are sensitive to specific assumptions. For that rea-
son, we use a reasonably tractable “small-scale” model rather than a larger
“black box”, employing Bayesian estimation techniques as well as sensitivity
analysis to quantify the uncertainty in our answers. As Leeper et al. (2011)
have pointed out, the New Keynesian model employed here together with its
prior already are already an important determinant of our answers. This is
desirable: the model assumptions should be crucial. The Bayesian estima-
tion serves to quantify the results more sharply and to inform us about the
overall posterior uncertainty.
The analysis here has much in common and is inspired by Cogan et al.
(2010), but there are a number of important differences. Like them, we start
from the benchmark Smets-Wouters Smets and Wouters (2007) New Keyne-
sian model and analyze the impact of the ARRA. In contrast to these authors,
we allow for a government raising revenues with distortionary taxation, and
we introduce credit-constrained consumers in our benchmark model.
This analysis postulates the presence of the ZLB, either with a determin-
istic or endogenized duration. However, Correia et al. (2010) have shown that
when consumption tax rates are a policy instrument, adjusting tax rates can
substitute for adjusting interest rates, thereby circumventing the ZLB. Since
we only consider various kinds of government spending as policy instruments
and treat taxes as determined by different feedback rules and exogenous
shocks, we neglect this potentially important channel of fiscal policy here.
We distinguish between short-run and long-run multipliers. For a bench-
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mark parameterization, we find modestly positive short-run multipliers with
a posterior mean of 0.51 and modestly negative long-run multipliers centered
around -0.42. The multiplier is particularly sensitive to the fraction of trans-
fers given to rule-of-thumb consumers, is sensitive to the anticipated length
of the zero lower bound, is sensitive to the capital share and is nonlinear in
the degree of price and wage stickiness. Reasonable specifications are con-
sistent with substantially negative short-run multipliers within a short time
frame.
We compute the welfare effects of the policy intervention separately for
both types of agents. The effects on unconstrained agents are significantly
negative but small as they are close to their unconstrained optimum. As
credit-constrained agents exhibit a higher rate of time-preference, we con-
sider a range of rates of time preference, up to 30% higher than that of
unconstrained agents on an annual basis. If agents are not too impatient,
the welfare gains through higher short-run consumption are more than offset
by the disutility of hours worked and lower consumption in the transition
back to the balanced growth path. However, starting at rates of time prefer-
ence about 20% higher than that of unconstrained agents, the welfare effects
can become significantly positive for constrained agents.
These models have also been criticized considerably for the lack of a
financial sector, a feature likely for understanding the events of 2008 (see
Uhlig, 2010a; Krugman, 2009; Buiter, 2009). We agree with this critique
and therefore feature a financial friction per the “short cut” of allowing for
time-varying wedges between the central bank interest rate, government bond
rates and the return to private capital, following Hall (2010). Our estimates
show that these wedges are indeed the key to understanding the recession of
2007 to 2009. Understanding their nature more deeply should therefore be
high on the research agenda, but is not the focus of this paper and beyond its
scope. An interesting explanation has been forwarded by Ilut and Schneider
(2011): increases in ambiguity in markets may result in increased wedges
between safe and risky assets.
Aside from the contributions cited above, the analysis here is related to
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a number of additional important contributions, notably Erceg and Linde
(2010) as well as Leeper and various co-authors (Davig and Leeper, 2009;
Leeper et al., 2010, 2009). In a model which also features distortionary
taxes, rule of thumb consumers, and financial frictions, Erceg and Linde
(2010) point out that the marginal multiplier differs from the average multi-
plier: If the stimulus is successful, the economy leaves the binding ZLB earlier
and the effect of additional spending is reduced. We address this issue by
endogenizing the duration of the ZLB in robustness tests. A key difference is
their focus on the short-run when the effects of adjusting distortionary taxes
instead of transfers matter less. Leeper et al. (2010) allow future government
consumption and transfers to adjust in order to rebalance the government
budget, and find that adjusting spending and component in addition to taxes
raises the multiplier. Leeper et al. (2009) point out the importance of pro-
ductive government investment and government capital, Davig and Leeper
(2009) allow for fiscal policy to switch between passive and active regimes
in a New Keynesian model. Interestingly, they find the largest difference in
multipliers due to switches in the monetary policy regime, which we address
by varying the ZLB duration.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 gives an overview of the
model. Section 2 discusses the estimation and calibration procedure. It pro-
vides a decomposition of the shocks driving the 2007-2009 recession, and
shows that financial frictions have been key, in stark contrast to the full-
sample variance decomposition. Both sections are complemented by a de-
tailed technical appendix which provides all model details as well as code
for replicating our results or calculating other fiscal experiments. Section 3
presents the main results on the fiscal multiplier. It provides a sensitivity
analysis which highlights the main driving forces behind our results. In ad-
dition, it provides a discussion of the welfare effects of the stimulus package.
Section 4 concludes.
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1 The model
The model is an extension of Smets and Wouters (2007), and we shall refer
the reader to that paper as well as to the technical appendix for the com-
plete details. Here we shall provide a brief overview as well as describe the
extensions.
The Smets and Wouters (2007) model is a New Keynesian model, set in
discrete time. There is a continuum of households. Workers supply homo-
geneous labor in monopolistic competition. Unions differentiate the labor
supplied by households and set wages for each type of labor. Wages are
Calvo-sticky. There is a continuum of intermediate good firms. They supply
intermediate goods in monopolistic competition. They set prices. Prices are
Calvo-sticky. Final goods use intermediate goods. Final goods are produced
in perfect competition. Households have preferences for final goods, allowing
for habit formation, as well as leisure. Capital is produced with investment
in the form of the final good, but there are adjustment costs to investment:
given installed capital and previous-period investment, the marginal prod-
uct of investment for producing new capital is decreasing. There is variable
capital utilization.
We extend the model with several features. Briefly, we constrain the in-
terest rate set by the central bank to be nonnegative. We let the government
raise revenues with distortionary taxation. We introduce credit-constrained
consumers. We feature government capital. We introduce a wedge between
various returns, as a stand-in for financial frictions. We adopt the notation
convention that variables indexed t are known in period t.
1.1 The zero lower bound
More precisely, the monetary authority follows a Taylor-type rule, but in-
terest rates may be held constant for a deterministic period of time or are
modelled to be bounded below by a constant slightly above zero. It is easier
to describe these scenarios it in their log-linearized form: for the original
version, the reader is referred to the technical appendix.
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In our benchmark scenario, the central bank keeps the interest rate at
its historical level of 2008:4 for k quarters. Households fully anticipate this
policy. Let RˆTRt denote the log-deviation of the shadow Taylor Rule return,
given by:
RˆTRt = ψ1(1− ρR)πˆt + ψ2(1− ρr)(yˆt − yˆ
f
t )
+ψ3Δ(yˆt − yˆ
f
t ) + ρRRˆ
TR
t−1 + mst
where πˆt is the log-deviation for inflation, yˆt is the log-deviation for output,
yˆft is the log-deviation in the flexible-price version of the economy and mst
is a shock to the interest rate set by the central bank.
The effective interest rate in our benchmark scenario is then given by:
RˆFFRt = (1− ZLBt)Rˆ
TR
t + ZLBtRˆ
FFR
0 ,
where ZLBt is an indicator function modelling which takes the value of one
while the ZLB lasts and zero otherwise. During the ZLB, the central bank
return equals its historical starting value, RˆFFR0 .
When endogenizing the ZLB duration, the central bank sets the log-
deviation of the central bank return to
RˆFFRt = max{−(1− R¯
FFR) + ¯, RˆTRt }
where R¯FFR is the steady state nominal return, ¯ > 0 is a constant set
slightly above zero for technical reasons (and set to ¯ = 0.25
400
in the numerical
calculations, implying a lower bound of 25 basis points for the central bank
interest rate).
1.2 Households, distortionary taxation and financial
frictions.
A fraction 1 − φ of the household is unconstrained and solves an infinite-
horizon maximization problem. The preferences of such a household j are
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given by
U = E
[
∞∑
t=0
βs
(
1
1− σ
(
ct(j)− h c
aggr
t−1
)1−σ)
exp
(
σ − 1
1 + ν
nt(j)
1+ν
)]
(1.1)
where ct(j) is consumption of household j, nt(j) is its labor supply and
c
aggr
t is aggregate consumption. h ∈ [0, 1) captures external habit formation,
σ denotes the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, and ν
equals the inverse of the labor supply elasticity. Households discount the
future by β ∈ (0, 1).
Following Trabandt and Uhlig (2010), we assume that the government
provides transfers and collects linear taxes on labor income, capital income
net of depreciation as well as consumption, adapted to the model here. The
budget constraint of household j is therefore given by
(1 + τ c)ct(j) + xt(j) +
Bnt (j)
Rgovt Pt
≤ sunconstrt +
Bnt−1(j)
Pt
+ (1− τnt )
Wt
Pt
(
nt(j) + λw,tn
(aggr)
t
)
+
+
(
(1− τk)
(
Rkt ut(j)
Pt
− a(ut(j))
)
+ δτk
)
((1− ωkt−1)k
p
t−1(j) + ω
k
t−1k
p,aggr
t−1 ) +
Πpt
Pt
,
and the capital accumulation constraint is given by
kpt (j) =
(1− δ)
μ
kpt−1(j) + q
x
t+s
(
1− ξ
(
xt(j)
xt−1(j)
))
xt(j),
where ct(j) is consumption, xt(j) is investment, B
n
t−1(j) are nominal govern-
ment bond holdings, nt(j) is labor, k
p
t−1(j) is private capital, and ut(j) is
capacity utilization, all of household j and chosen by household j. Rgovt is
the nominal return for the one-period government bond from t to t+1 set at
date t, n
(aggr)
t is aggregate labor, Pt is the aggregate price level, Wt is aggre-
gate wages, λw,t is the aggregate mark-up from union-determined wages, R
k
t
is the undistorted return on capital and ωkt is a friction or wedge on private
capital markets. In the budget constraint, note that it enters as a variable
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known at date t− 1, so that the distortions to future capital returns impacts
on investment in the current period. Also note that the individual losses due
to this wedge are redistributed in the aggregate, so that the wedge distorts
investment decisions, but does not destroy aggregate resources directly. Πpt
are nominal firm profits, qxt+s is an investment-specific technology parameter,
ξ(·) are adjustment costs, satisfying ξ(μ) = ξ′(μ) = 0, ξ′′ > 0, τ c, τn, τk
are taxes and sunconstrt are real transfers to unconstrained households, all
taken as given by household j, and a(·) represents the strictly increasing and
strictly convex cost function of varying capacity utilization. In particular,
note that taxing capital net of depreciation implies deducting a depreciation
rate that depends on capacity utilization. Furthermore, the household re-
ceives labor income both directly from working as well as indirectly from the
surplus that unions charge on labor: both sources of labor income are taxed.
We assume that the interest rate Rgovt on government bonds, which un-
constrained households can freely trade, equals the federal funds rate RFFRt
up to an exogenous friction or wedge ωgovt :
Rgovt = (1 + ω
gov
t )R
FFR
t .
In difference to Smets and Wouters (2007), the discount factor β of the
households is not subject to shocks. Rather, we focus on the wedges ωkt and
ωgovt on financial markets as part of the household budget constraint.
We assume that a fraction φ ∈ (0, 0.5) of the households is credit-constrained.
In their version of the budget constraint, Bnt−1(j) = 0, xt(j) = 0 and
kpt−1(j) = 0, i.e. these households do not save or borrow. They do re-
ceive profit income from intermediate producers (which equals zero in the
steady state). Put differently, the budget constraint of a credit-constrained
household j is
(1 + τ c)ct(j)
≤ sconstrt + (1− τ
n
t )
Wt
Pt
(
nt(j) + λw,tn
(aggr)
t
)
+
Πpt
Pt
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where sconstrt are the transfers to credit-constrained agents. As a justifica-
tion, one may suppose that credit-constrained discount the future substan-
tially more steeply, and are thus uninterested in accumulating government
bonds or private capital, unless their returns are extraordinarily high. Con-
versely, these households find it easy to default on any loans, and are therefore
not able to borrow. We hold the identity of credit-constrained households and
thereby their fraction of the total population constant. Note that we allow
the transfers sconstrt to constrained households to differ from the transfers
sunconstrt to the unconstrained households.
Wages are set by unions on behalf of the households, recognizing that
each differentiated wage is Calvo-sticky. Since workers of the unconstrained
households represent the majority in these unions, wages are set according
to their preferences. Firms hire workers randomly from both types of house-
holds, so that labor supplied by both types of households is the same in
equilibrium.
1.3 Government capital and policy feedback rules
As the ARRA contains a government investment, we wish to feature gov-
ernment capital as productive input. We also wish to keep the final goods
production function to have constant returns to scale on the firm level, in
order to maintain the assumption of perfect competition there. We there-
fore assume that government capital Kgt−1 enters private production as an
externality for the individual intermediate-goods firm, similar to the model
in Barro and Sala-i Martin (1992). In order to obtain an aggregate constant-
returns-to-scale production function before fixed costs, we assume that the
externality of Kgt−1 at the firm level is relative to aggregate output, before
fixed costs.
Specifically, we assume that the technology of intermediate firm i is given
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by
Yt(i) = ˜
a
t
(
Kgt−1∫ 1
0
Yt(ι)dι + Φμt
) ζ
1−ζ
(Keff.t (i))
α(μtnt(i))
1−α − μtΦ,
where Φ are fixed costs, Keff.t is effective capital used by firm i, created from
aggregate private capital,
Keff.t = utk
p
t−1(1− φ)
(assuming symmetric choices for the unconstrained households), where at
is an exogenous, stochastic component of TFP, and where the services of
government capital Kgt−1 are subject to congestion: what matters is the ratio
of government capital to average gross output, i.e. inclusive of the fixed
costs. As a result, the aggregate production function in the absence of price
dispersion is given by
Yt = 
a
t K
g
t−1
ζKst
α(1−ζ)(μtnt)
(1−α)(1−ζ) − μtΦ, at ≡ (˜
a
t )
1−ζ .
where TFP in terms of the private factors of production is
TFP = at K
g
t−1
ζμ(1−α)(1−ζ)t
We assume that the accumulation of government capital is symmetric to the
accumulation of private capital, i.e., is subject to a similar technology,
kgt =
(1− δ)
μ
kgt−1 + q
g
t
(
1− Sg
( xgt + x,gt
xgt−1 + 
x,g
t−1
))
(xgt + 
x,g
t )
where Sg(μ) = S
′
g(μ) = 0, S
′′
g (·) > 0 represent adjustment costs, q
x,g
t is
a shock to the government-investment-specific technology parameter, and
x,gt is additional, exogenous government investment. We assume that the
capacity utilization of government capital and therefore its depreciation is
constant. We assume that the government chooses investment to maximize
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the present discounted value of output net of investment costs, except for a
discretionary fiscal stimulus, denoted by x,gt and set to zero at steady state.
Put differently, the first-order condition of the government determines op-
timal government investment, while actual government investment may be
higher by some amount chosen along the stimulus path. To enforce the ex-
pansion of government investment, we stipulate that the government cannot
undo the stimulus investment for the first twelve periods, but has to provide
at least replacement for the depreciated ARRA investment – otherwise, the
deviation from the optimality condition would imply complete crowding out.
We assume a feedback rule for labor tax rates as follows (for the full detail,
see the technical appendix), following Uhlig (2010b). Break the period-by-
period government budget constraint in two parts. On the “right side”, there
is a “deficit” dt, prior to new debt and labor taxes
dt = gov.spend.+subs.t + old debt repaym.t
−cons.tax rev.,cap.tax rev.t − τ¯
l lab.incomet
which needs to be financed on the “left side” with labor tax revenues and
new debt,
τ lt lab.incomet + new debtt = dt
Along the balanced growth path, there is a path for the debt level as well as
the deficit d¯t. The labor tax rate is then assumed to solve
(τ lt − τ¯
l) lab.incomet = ψτ (dt − d¯t) + τ,l
where τ,l is a labor tax shock.
1.4 Shocks
We assume that there are ten stochastic processes driving the economy. Un-
less stated otherwise, the processes follow independent AR(1)’s in logs: (1)
Technology ˜at , (2) Gov.bond wedge ω
gov
t : financial friction wedge between
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FFR and gov’t bonds, (3) Priv. bond wedge ωkt : financial friction wedge be-
tween gov’t bond returns and a component of the returns to private capital,
(4) Gov. spending plus net export. Co-varies with technology, (5) Investment
specific technology qxt (rel. price), (6) Gov. investment specific technology q
g
t
(rel. price), (7) Monetary policy mst, (8) Labor tax rates τ,l, (9) Mark-up
for prices: ARMA(1,1), and (10) Mark-up: wages: ARMA(1,1).
For the stimulus plan, we use three series, capturing the changes in trans-
fers, government consumption and government investment. We followed the
strategy of Cogan et al. (2010), but our decomposition of government spend-
ing into consumption and investment as well as the need to pay particular
attention to transfers meant that we needed to reclassify the various spend-
ing categories, according to the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
(ARRA). As source, we have used the estimates by the Congressional Budget
Office (CBO, 2009) for the effects of the ARRA by budget title. The annual
time path for these expenditures is directly taken from the CBO, whereas
the distribution within each year is proportional to the Cogan et al. (2010)
path within each year. The details on the components are contained in ap-
pendix 5.1. A graphical overview on the time path is presented in figure 1.
Essentially, we decomposed their government spending path into a separate
consumption and investment path, and furthermore included transfers. Most
importantly, much of the transfers are “front-loaded”, i.e. occur earlier than
government spending, while the “stimulus” government investment occurs
later.
Furthermore, we assume that the central bank will leave the federal funds
rate unchanged at near zero for eight quarters, and that this is fully antic-
ipated, as of the first quarter of 2009. For the numerical calculations, the
relaxation algorithm proposed by Juillard (1996) and implemented in Dynare
is particularly convenient for the type of forward-simulation (rather than es-
timation) performed here. By solving a potentially time-varying system of
equations backward from terminal conditions, it allows to incorporate an-
ticipated shocks even when they interact coefficients for example to “switch
off” the interest rate rule temporarily. In Drautzburg and Uhlig (2011) we
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investigate whether the particular modelling and solution method we employ
here to account for the ZLB may play a role for our results.
2 Estimation and Analysis
2.1 Data and Estimation
We solve the model, using a log-linear approximation and Dynare. The
first-order conditions and their log-linearized versions are in a technical ap-
pendix, available up on request. We estimate the model, using the following
ten time series: (1) Output: Chained 2005 real GDP, growth rates, (2) Con-
sumption: Private consumption expenditure, growth rates, (3) Investment:
private fixed investment, growth rates, (4) Government investment: growth
rates, (5) Hours worked: Civilian employment index × average nonfarm busi-
ness weekly hours worked index, demeaned log, (6) Inflation: GDP deflator,
quarterly growth rates, (7) Wages: Nonfarm Business, hourly compensation
index. Growth rates, (8) FFR: Converted to quarterly rates, (9) Corporate-
Treasury bond yield spread: Moody’s Baa index – 10 yr Treasury bond at
quarterly rates, demeaned, (10) Dallas Fed gross federal debt series at par
value, demeaned log.
Sources and details for the data are described in appendix 5.1. We use an
updated version of the Smets-Wouters dataset, for the range 1947:2-2009:4,
using quarterly data and four periods for the start-up. In difference to the
original dataset, we classify consumer durables as investment expenditure.
The estimation of the model uses data from 1948:2 up to 2008:4, with the
additional four quarters for comparison of the model prediction to the actual
evolution and the first four quarters used to presample. We choose the longer
sample, as it includes the Korean war as well as the Vietnam war build-
up, in contrast to the shorter Smets-Wouters sample from 1967 onwards.
Figure 2 shows the additional evidence from the larger fluctuation in fiscal
expenditures available in this larger sample.
We fixed (“calibrated”) several parameters a priori. For tax rates and the
13
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Figure 1: Our three stimulus components and their comparison to Cogan
et al. (2010). Essentially, we decomposed their government spending path
into a separate consumption and investment path, and furthermore included
transfers.
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Figure 2: Comparing our extended sample to the original Smets-Wouters
data set. Notice the additional variation in government spending in the larger
sample.
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debt-GDP ratio, we relied on Trabandt and Uhlig (2010). Time averages of
government spending components were obtained from the NIPA, Table 3.1
(quarterly), lines 35 (investment), 16 (consumption), transfers (17). Govern-
ment consumption includes net exports (line 2 minus line 14 in Table 4.1).
To obtain ratios relative to GDP, GDP data from line 1, Table 1.1.5 was
used. Following Smets and Wouters (2007), the Kimball curvature parame-
ter is taken from Eichenbaum and Fisher (2007), who set it to roughly match
it to their data on the empirical frequency of price adjustment. Following
Cooley and Prescott (1995), the depreciation rate is derived from the law
of motion for capital and their observation of x¯
k¯
= 0.0076 at quarterly fre-
quency. The complete list of calibrated parameters, and their comparison to
the corresponding parameters in Smets and Wouters (2007), if available, is in
table 1. We estimate our model, using Dynare and a fairly standard Bayesian
prior. Details on the estimation can be found in appendix 5.2. The estimates
largely agree with those found by Smets and Wouters (2007), leaning some-
what more to more endogenous persistence: the habit parameter is slightly
higher, as are estimates of price and wage stickiness, for example. Like these
authors, our estimates also yield a rather small capital share: our posterior
mean is 0.24, while they found 0.19. This is at odds with calibrated values
in the literature, see e.g. Cooley and Prescott (1995), and may play a sub-
stantial role in calculating the long-horizon impact of distortionary taxation.
We shall investigate this issue in our sensitivity analysis. The calibrated
government investment-to-GDP ratio as well as the estimated growth trend
μ ≈ 1.005 implies a government share in production of ζ ≈ 2.30 percent.
2.2 Decomposing the 2007-2009 recession
The model allows the decomposition of movements in our ten macroeconomic
time series into the ten shocks that caused them. The first-order conditions
of the households imply:
1 = βEt
[
uc,t+1
uc,t
Rgovt
πt+1
]
= βEt
[
uc,t+1
uc,t
(1 + ωgovt )
RFFRt
πt+1
]
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Table 1: Calibrated parameters.
SW (1966:1–2004:4) This paper (1948:2–2008:4)
Depreciation δ 0.025 0.0145
Wage mark-up λw 0.5 0.5
Kimball curvature goods mkt. ηˆp 10 10
Kimball curvature labor mkt. ηˆw 10 10
Capital tax τk n/a 0.36
Consumption tax τ c n/a 0.05
Labor tax τn n/a 0.28
Share credit constrained φ n/a 0.25
Gov. spending, net exports-GDP g¯
y¯
0.18 0.153
Gov. investment-GDP x¯
g
y¯
n/a 0.04
Debt-GDP b¯
y¯
n/a 4× 0.63
= βEt
[
uc,t+1
uc,t
(
(1− ωkt )((1− τ
k)(rkt+1ut+1 − a(ut+1)) + δτ
k) + (1− δ)
Qt+1
Qt
)]
where ωgovt is due to government bond shocks and creates a wedge between
between the FFR and government bonds, while ωkt is due to private bond
shocks, creating a wedge between government bonds and private capital. Qt
is the price of capital. It is instructive to simplify the above expression by
assuming a constant price of capital Qt and constant capacity utilization as
well as ignoring uncertainty. Then the first line can be substituted in the
second to yield:
1 =
1
(1 + ωgovt )
πt+1
RFFRt
(
(1− ωkt )(r
k
t+1 − τ
k(rkt+1 − δ)) + (1− δ)
)
.
This equation shows that, up to a first order approximation, the wedges
ωkt (after re-scaling) and ω
b
t both add up to the total wedge between the
return on private capital net of taxes and the Federal Funds Rate RFFRt .
These wedges are stand-ins for financial frictions. It is therefore interesting
to examine their role for the 2007-2009 recession.
As figure 2.2 as well as table 2 document, shocks to these wedges indeed
played a large role in understanding the recent recession, accounting alone for
over 100% of the decline in output, in stark contrast to their small contribu-
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tion to the full-sample variance of output as well as other included time series.
Figure 4 provides the impulse response to a one-standard deviation shock to
these two wedges. As one can see, the government bond shock depresses
output, consumption and private as well as government investment, whereas
the shock to the spread between private bonds and government bonds leads
to a decline in consumption only with some delay and actually increases gov-
ernment investments. These shocks furthermore result in a modest decline
in the federal funds rate (not shown).
Since not only GDP growth but also unemployment is at the center of
many public debates, we back out a predicted change in the unemployment
rate from the model. To that end we regress the quarterly unemployment
rate on the hours worked measure used to estimate model and use the implied
OLS estimate to infer the effect on the unemployment rate. The fit is rea-
sonable with an R2 of 0.77. We neglect the additional parameter uncertainty
introduced because of the uncertain estimates of the regression coefficients.1
3 Results
Armed with our posterior estimates as well as the specification of the stim-
ulus path, we shall now proceed to calculate the implied effects. We provide
confidence bands, covering 90 percent or 67 percent of the posterior proba-
bility.
Our main focus is on the fiscal multiplier, i.e. the ratio of output changes
to the total stimulus-planned change in spending and transfers. Note that
due to the eventual balancing of the government budget, there will also be
an induced movement in tax rates as a “secondary” effect. As is customary,
we shall not include these secondary movements in the denominator, i.e. in
quantifying the stimulus-planned changes. As this is a dynamic model, the
horizon plays a role. Following Uhlig (2010b), we use the net present value
fiscal multiplier ϕt, dividing the net present value of output changes up to
1Details of the estimation are available in table 12 and figure 20 in the technical
appendix
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Figure 3: Historical Shock Decomposition: Output. Results are at the poste-
rior median. 2007:4 is the NBER recession date.
Table 2: Historical decomposition of recent recession and overall variance
decomposition for output. All numbers are at the Bayesian posterior mean.
2008:4 vs. 2007:4 Total Sample
Historical decomposition Variance decomposition
Shock total percent percent
Gov. bond -3.76 81.69 5.11
Priv. bond -1.41 30.63 1.38
Technology 0.89 -19.44 19.23
Price markup -0.74 16.14 6.68
Gov. spending 0.60 -12.95 3.49
Priv. inv. -0.30 6.57 14.04
Labor tax -0.26 5.60 19.63
Monetary pol. 0.22 -4.69 17.37
Wage Markup 0.14 -3.11 8.38
Gov. inv. 0.03 -0.65 4.59
Initial Values -0.01 0.22 n/a
Sum -4.60 100.00 100.00
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some horizon t by the change in government spending and transfers until the
same time. I.e., we shall use
ϕt =
t∑
s=1
(
μs
s∏
j=1
R−1j,ARRA
)
yˆs/
t∑
s=1
(
μs
s∏
j=1
R−1j,ARRA
)
gˆs (3.1)
where ϕt: horizon-t multiplier, Rj,ARRA is the government bond return, from
j − 1 to j, yˆs is the output change at date s due to ARRA in percent of the
balanced-growth GDP path and gˆs: ARRA spending at date s in percent of
the balanced-growth GDP path.
3.1 Benchmark results
Figure 5 contains our benchmark results for output, the unemployment rate,
the federal funds rate, inflation, government debt, and consumption.2 These
graphs are perhaps reminiscent of the information shown in the official White
House piece by Bernstein and Romer (2009). However, we include an im-
portant piece of information, which is missing there. The short-run debt
dynamics shown here induce a long-run debt-and-tax dynamics, shown in
figure 6. The increase in labor tax rates long after the fiscal stimulus phase
has finished induces the decline of output for many years to come.
The resulting fiscal multiplier will therefore decline with the horizon. The
fiscal multipliers for the shorter horizon, shown in the left panel of figure 7
can therefore be quite misleading in terms of assessing the long-term costs of
fiscal stimulus. Indeed, the long-run multipliers are considerably smaller or
negative, compared to the short-run multipliers, as show in the right panel
of figure 7. These results are qualitatively in line with Uhlig (2010b), though
the results are quantitatively rather different: the long-run fiscal multipliers
are negative there and here, but considerably more negative there. One may
be tempted to read the difference as “relief” compared to the pessimistic
scenario in Uhlig (2010b). Note, however, that the model here is heavily
2 Results for the consumption of both types of agents, real wages, tax rates, and
investment are shown in Figure 15.
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Figure 5: Benchmark impact of ARRA.
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Figure 6: Short- and long-run impact of ARRA.
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tilted towards a model in which fiscal stimulus is often thought to work
well: we therefore believe that the negative long-run effects of fiscal stimulus
should give pause to arguments in its favor. Even at the short horizon, the
benchmark multiplier is just around 0.5.
3.2 Sensitivity analysis: overview
Which features of the model contribute to the size of the fiscal multipliers,
which are particularly important? Where does the difference to Uhlig (2010b)
come from? Understanding the differences and understanding the sensitivity
of the benchmark results to key assumptions is important. Figure 8 as well
as table 3 and table 4 provide an overview of our sensitivity analysis. The
next subsections provide the details.
3.3 Sensitivity to distortionary taxation
Along with Uhlig (2010b), we emphasize the importance of assuming dis-
tortionary rather than lump-sum taxes in this analysis. Figure 9 provides a
comparison. As should be clear, distortionary rather than lump-sum taxa-
tion makes a considerable difference and creates significantly lower long-run
multipliers, whereas the short-run multipliers are not significantly different.
Adjusting consumption taxes only yields a slightly higher multiplier than
adjusting labor tax rates.
Note that the dramatic difference due to distortionary taxation is not an
artefact of the stimulus being spread out over time. To illustrate this, we con-
sider the case when the entire stimulus is spent uniformly over the first four
quarters and compute the multiplier for two cases: when lump-sum transfers
are adjusted and when distortionary labor taxes are adjusted. Figure 3.3
shows a large difference. When transfers are adjusted, the multiplier is large
and in excess of one, whereas the median multiplier with distortionary taxes
declines to almost minus one in the long run.
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Figure 7: Short-run and long-run fiscal multipliers in the benchmark param-
eterization.
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Table 3: Long run fiscal multipliers as t →∞: sensitivity
Scenario 5 percent 16.5 percent median 83.5 percent 95 percent
Benchmark -0.72 -0.61 -0.42 -0.22 -0.04
lump-sum taxes 0.34 0.44 0.60 0.78 0.94
consumption taxes -0.48 -0.38 -0.20 -0.02 0.14
ZLB: 0 Quart. -1.30 -1.18 -1.03 -0.87 -0.73
ZLB: 12 Quart. -0.45 -0.31 -0.03 0.27 0.52
ZLB: Endogenous -0.56 -0.43 -0.19 0.14 0.57
RoT=0.15 -0.91 -0.79 -0.63 -0.43 -0.26
RoT=0.35 -0.59 -0.44 -0.24 -0.04 0.18
Share transfers to RoT= 0.00 -0.86 -0.77 -0.65 -0.52 -0.42
Share transfers to RoT= 0.50 -0.64 -0.50 -0.24 0.03 0.29
Share transfers to RoT= 1.00 -0.50 -0.28 0.16 0.64 1.05
Priv. capital share=0.35 -1.13 -0.98 -0.76 -0.51 -0.27
price/wage-stickiness=0.10 × estim. -0.96 -0.87 -0.75 -0.62 -0.52
price/wage-stickiness=0.50 × estim. -0.78 -0.69 -0.58 -0.46 -0.37
price/wage-stickiness=1.15 × estim. -0.91 -0.76 -0.56 -0.33 -0.12
Budget balance: ψτ = 0.025 -0.70 -0.58 -0.40 -0.21 -0.04
Budget balance: ψτ = 0.05 -0.77 -0.66 -0.49 -0.30 -0.13
Table 4: One-year fiscal multipliers: sensitivity
Scenario 5 percent 16.5 percent median 83.5 percent 95 percent
Scenario 5 % 16.5 % median 83.5 % 95 %
Benchmark 0.46 0.48 0.52 0.57 0.60
lump-sum taxes 0.55 0.57 0.61 0.66 0.70
consumption taxes 0.48 0.50 0.54 0.58 0.61
ZLB: 0 Quart. 0.17 0.20 0.23 0.27 0.30
ZLB: 12 Quart. 0.75 0.78 0.84 0.93 1.02
ZLB: Endogenous 0.51 0.54 0.60 0.69 0.78
RoT=0.15 0.39 0.42 0.46 0.49 0.52
RoT=0.35 0.47 0.54 0.59 0.64 0.69
Share transfers to RoT= 0.00 0.25 0.26 0.29 0.31 0.33
Share transfers to RoT= 0.50 0.65 0.69 0.75 0.81 0.85
Share transfers to RoT= 1.00 1.05 1.11 1.21 1.32 1.39
Priv. capital share=0.35 0.44 0.47 0.52 0.57 0.61
price/wage-stickiness=0.10 × estim. 0.05 0.07 0.11 0.14 0.16
price/wage-stickiness=0.50 × estim. 0.35 0.38 0.42 0.47 0.50
price/wage-stickiness=1.15 × estim. 0.44 0.46 0.50 0.53 0.56
Budget balance: ψτ = 0.025 0.48 0.51 0.54 0.58 0.61
Budget balance: ψτ = 0.05 0.43 0.46 0.49 0.53 0.56
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Figure 9: Fiscal multipliers. Comparing distortionary labor taxes (bench-
mark) to consumption and lump-sum taxation.
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Figure 10: Fiscal multipliers. Stimulus spend uniformly over first four quar-
ters. Comparing distortionary labor taxes (benchmark) lump-sum taxation.
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Within the range of stable parameter values, increasing the speed at which
the budget is balanced ψτ leads to lower multipliers as shown in tables 3 on
page 25 and 4 on page 25.3
3.4 Sensitivity to the length zero lower bound
The literature has emphasized the sensitivity of fiscal multipliers to the zero
lower bound, and to generating “fiscal stimulus”, while the central bank is
not changing its interest rates, see Eggertsson (2010) as well as Christiano
et al. (2009). Our benchmark has been set to 8 quarters, implying that at the
beginning of 2009, households anticipated the zero lower bound constraint
to no longer bind at the beginning of 2011. That time horizon seems to have
been extended meanwhile. However, it is hard to argue that this was antic-
ipated two years ago. Nonetheless, we provide some experimentation here.
Figure 11 provides that sensitivity analysis. It shows that when we endo-
genize the ZLB, the resulting multipliers are comparable since a successful
stimulus shortens the ZLB and thereby reduces its effectiveness, even though
the expected duration is longer. With an endogenous ZLB or a deterministic
duration of twelve quarters, the long-run multipliers are centered at -0.19
and -0.03. 4
3.5 Sensitivity to credit-constrained households
The “credit-contrained” or “rule-of-thumb” households are important in two
respects. First, there is a sizeable portion of the population which violates
Ricardian equivalence. Second, the split of transfers between these house-
holds and the unconstrained households leads to distributional and thereby
aggregate consequences. It turns out that the second effect is more important
than the first.
3 Note that the habit formation prevents us from examining significantly higher speeds
of budget balance. In the absence of habit formation, ψτ = 1 is consistent with a locally
unique equilibrium.
4Figure 17 in the technical appendix shows that with an endogenous ZLB only about
10% of all simulations results in an ZLB exceeding three years.
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Figure 11: Short-run and long-run fiscal multipliers: sensitivity to the length
of the zero lower bound.
The first row of table 5 shows the change in the fiscal multipliers, when
we change the share of the population which is credit-constrained. In this ex-
periment, the transfers are equally distributed across the population, i.e., the
share of the transfers to the credit-constrained population equals the share of
that population. This confounds two effects, however. The first is the mere
rise in the share of credit-constrained households, but leaving their share of
transfer receipts the same: this is shown in the second row of table 5. The
second is the share of transfers received by the credit-constrained households.
The third row of table 5 therefore varies the share of transfers received by
these households, but keeping their share of the population constant at the
benchmark value of 25 percent. While the second experiment has a rather
modest impact on the short-run multiplier, the last experiment has a larger
impact there. The long-run multipliers move considerably for both experi-
ments. For example and for the last experiment, the median estimate, the
long-run fiscal multiplier changes from -0.51 to 0.29, as that fraction is varied
from zero to 100 percent.
One may wish to conclude from this that “fiscal stimulus” in the form of
transfers to constrained agents may be quite effective in increasing output.
That may be so. However, the modeling of the credit-constrained agents is
done here with the simple short-cut of assuming that these agents do not keep
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savings and cannot borrow. For a more sophisticated exercise, the bounds to
borrowing and savings should be endogenized, and may actually depend on
the size of the government transfers. Furthermore, micro data can potentially
be informative about the degree to which households are credit-constrained
or refrain from saving. A deeper investigation into the details is called for, if
“fiscal stimulus” programs in the future are to focus on this particular group.
3.6 Sensitivity to the composition of the stimulus
We departed from the original Smets-Wouters model in order to model the
fiscal stimulus in more detail by being able to distinguish between money
spend on government transfers, consumption, and investment. In our model,
each component has a different impact on the economy. As discussed above,
who receives the transfers is an important question. Since constrained house-
holds spend all their income, transfers to them are closer to direct government
spending. Discretionary government investment increases private sector pro-
ductivity, but may also crowd out optimal government investment, thereby
effectively lowering the size of the long-term debt burden faced by house-
holds. The right panel in Figure 8 shows that in our benchmark model,
the government investment component contributes to a positive multiplier,
whereas the government consumption and transfer components lower the
overall multiplier below zero.
3.7 Sensitivity to the capital share
The estimated capital share is around 0.24 rather than 0.35, as often used in
the calibration literature, see Cooley and Prescott (1995). The comparisons
in figure 12 reveal, that the results are quite sensitive to this parameter,
which in our model crucially also governs the tax base for labor taxes.
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Table 5: Short-run and long-run fiscal multipliers: sensitivity to credit-
constrained fraction of the population and their share of transfers. First
line: all households receive the same amount of transfers, i.e. fraction of
constrained households and total transfers rise together. Second line, only
the fraction of constrained household rises. Third line: only the share of
transfers going to constrained households rises.
one year multiplier long-run multiplier
Transfers = RoT fraction = 0.10 0.25 0.40 0.10 0.25 0.40
Const. transfers/household: 0.33 0.54 0.82 -0.62 -0.31 0.12
Transfers =0.25, RoT fraction = 0.10 0.25 0.40 0.10 0.25 0.40
Fixed absolute transfers 0.45 0.54 0.66 -0.53 -0.31 -0.03
RoT Share =0.25, Transfers = 0 0.25 1.00 0 0.25 1.00
Fixed population share 0.31 0.54 1.23 -0.51 -0.31 0.29
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Figure 12: Short-run and long-run fiscal multipliers: sensitivity to the capital
share.
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Figure 13: Short-run and long-run fiscal multipliers: sensitivity to price and
wage stickiness.
3.8 Sensitivity to price and wage stickiness
Finally, it may be interesting to document the impact of the price and wage
stickiness on the fiscal multipliers: this is done in figure 13. Note that the
median estimates are ζp = 0.81 and ζw = 0.83 for the Calvo parameter
for prices and wages. In the figure we consider values of 10% to 115% of
these median estimates, scaling both parameters proportionately. While the
figure mostly shows an increase in the multiplier with increasingly sticky
prices and wages, this is no longer true when prices and wages get very
sticky. Essentially, at that point, future inflation due to the zero lower bound
no longer induces upward pressure on prices and wages, thereby lessening
the impact of fiscal stimulus. Reducing the overall stickiness leads to much
larger inflation responses (cf. Figure 18 in the technical appendix) and may
therefore be more realistic than the estimated stickiness parameters.
3.9 Welfare effects
Both the long-run and short-run multiplier are silent on welfare implications
of the stimulus package. If the output increase is driven by a disproportionate
increase in hours worked, consumers are likely to be worse off even if the
multiplier is large and positive.
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Given perfect foresight of the stimulus plan, we can calculate the com-
pensating variation in lifetime consumption along the balanced growth path
which makes consumers indifferent between ARRA and the modified historic
growth path. Let Γi × 100 be the percentage of consumption without the
stimulus, which consumers of type i, i ∈ {RA,RoT} would be willing to give
up each period to have the ARRA in place. We provide an explicit formula in
a technical appendix. The expressions amount to calculating the net present
value of future utility changes. The discount rate for each consumer type
enters here in a crucial manner.
Two caveats complicate the welfare calculation. First, the calculation is
numerically challenging because at our estimates the effective discount fac-
tor βRAμ
1−σ is close to unity so that convergence is slow. Numerical error is
important to address because we are relating the cost of an intervention over
about ten years to lifetime consumption so that errors of a small magnitude
might be important for the results. Second, our parameter estimates are only
directly applicable to unconstrained households, whereas social welfare de-
pends on both types of households. If constrained households are sufficiently
impatient and receive a high weight in the social welfare function, the results
presented above could be overturned because constrained agent might value
the initial consumption increase enough. The calibration of the discount rate
for the constrained households is a challenge, however. Lawrance (1991) finds
that rates of time preference vary by 7 percent on an annual basis across rich
and poor households. Using data on individual choices between lump-sum
and annuity payments, Warner and Pleeter (2001) find differences in annual
rates of time preference of up to 30 percent, varying by various character-
istics. We therefore consider two discount factors for the RoT agents per
adding 7% as well as 30% to the annual discount factor of the unconstrained
agents, i.e.
1/βRoT ∈ {1/βRA + 0.07/4, 1/βRA + 0.3/4}
noting that our model is for quarterly data. We also vary over a wider range.
For the unconstrained households, the welfare effects are small but signif-
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icantly negative according to our calculations in Table 6. The median effect
on constrained agents is -0.02 percent, independent of the length of the ZLB
with the 90 percent posterior confidence intervals ranging from -0.04 percent
to -0.01 percent. The small magnitude is not surprising given that small
deviations from the optimum have small effects on welfare of unconstrained
agents. Unconstrained agents suffer from an increase in hours worked and
for most parameter values considered also from a drop in consumption, ex-
plaining the negative sign.
The effect on constrained agents is ambiguous, as lines two and three in
table 6 show. If the discount factgor of the RoT agents is just 7% higher
than that of the unconstrained agents, the welfare effect is negative, but it is
positive, if their discount factor is 30% higher. Figure 14 shows the results for
a range of discount factor increases, compared to the unconstrained agents.
Beyond the threshold of adding 10%, a higher rate of time preference leads
to a more positive evaluation of the stimulus.
4 Conclusions
We have quantified the size, uncertainty and sensitivity of fiscal multipliers
in response to the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of
2009. To that end, we have extended the benchmark Smets and Wouters
(2007) New Keynesian model, allowing for credit-constrained households, a
central bank constrained by the zero lower bound, government capital and a
government raising taxes with distortionary taxation. We have distinguished
Table 6: Welfare effects (Γ×100) of stimulus: Lifetime-consumption equiva-
lent of compensating variation for stimulus. Posterior median (90% posterior
confidence interval).
Scenario 8 quarters ZLB 0 quarters ZLB 12 quarters ZLB
Unconstrained agents -0.02(-0.04,-0.02) -0.02(-0.04,-0.01) -0.02(-0.03,-0.02)
RoT, 7% higher annual DF -0.08(-0.14,-0.02) -0.15(-0.22,-0.09) -0.09(-0.17,0.01)
RoT, 30% higher annual DF 0.59(0.35,0.91) 0.44(0.21,0.63) 0.54(0.20,0.92)
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Figure 14: Long-run welfare gains from stimulus: 8 and 12 qtr. ZLB, varying
annual rate of time preference compared to unconstrained agents.
between short-run and long-run multipliers. For a benchmark parameteriza-
tion, we find modestly positive short-run multipliers with a posterior mean of
0.52 and modestly negative long-run multipliers centered around -0.42. The
multiplier is particularly sensitive to the type of taxes used to finance the
ARRA, is sensitive to the fraction of transfers given to credit-constrained
households, is sensitive to the anticipated length of the zero lower bound,
is sensitive to the capital share and is nonlinear in the degree of price and
wage stickiness. Reasonable specifications are consistent with substantially
negative short-run multipliers within a short time frame. Furthermore, the
policy intervention may lower the welfare of agents in the economy: uncon-
strained agents would have a higher lifetime utility without the ARRA and
even impatient constrained agents may be better off without the intervention
because of the disutility of hours worked during the expansion and lower con-
sumption in the transition to the long-run offset short-run gains from higher
consumption.
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5 Appendix
5.1 Data
The different series come from the NIPA tables, the FRED 2 database and the
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) database. Federal debt data is taken from
Dallas Fed database. Nominal series for wages, consumption, government
and private investment deflated with general GDP deflator.
Generally we follow Smets and Wouters (2007) when creating our dataset
with the following exemptions: we use civilian non-institutionalized popula-
tion throughout, although the series is not seasonally adjusted before 1976.
The base year for real GDP is 2005 instead of 1996. We include durables
consumption in investment instead of consumption. Using the same defi-
nition, all series but real wages exhibit a correlation of almost 100 percent
across the two datasets. For the change in real wages, the correlation is 0.9.
Including durables consumption in investment causes the correlation for the
investment series to drop to 0.70 and for consumption to 0.78.
Since no data for the Corporate-Treasury bond yield spread is available
before 1953:1 we set it to zero for the missing periods. We use the secondary
market rate for 3-month TBill before 1954:3 as the FFR is not available.
The categorization of the various stimulus components is shown in detail
in tables 9, 10 and 11 in the technical appendix. As source, we have used
Congressional Budget Office (2009), specifically “Table 2: Estimated cost
of the conference agreement for H.R. 1, the American Recovery and Rein-
vestment Act of 2009, as posted on the website of the House Committee on
Rules.” The annual time path for these expenditures is taken from Congres-
sional Budget Office (2009) and the annual sum for each component is split
across quarters in proportion to the aggregate series in Cogan et al. (2010).
5.2 Estimation
Tables 7 and 8 contain the results from estimating our model, using Dynare
and a Bayesian prior.
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Table 7: Estimation, part 1. The calibrated government investment-to-GDP
ratio as well as the estimated growth trend μ implies a government share in
production of ζ = 2.30 percent.
Prior Prior mean (s.d.) SW Model Our Model
66:1-08:4 49:2-08:4
Adj. cost S ′′(μ) norm 4.000 (1.500) 5.93 (1.1) 4.51 (0.78)
Risk aversion σ norm 1.500 (0.375) 1.42 (0.11) 1.17 (0.08)
Habit h beta 0.700 (0.100) 0.7 (0.04) 0.85 (0.02)
Calvo wage ζw beta 0.500 (0.100) 0.77 (0.05) 0.83 (0.03)
Inv. labor sup. ela. ν norm 2.000 (0.750) 1.96 (0.54) 2.16 (0.51)
Calvo prices ζp beta 0.500 (0.100) 0.69 (0.05) 0.81 (0.03)
Wage indexation ιw beta 0.500 (0.150) 0.62 (0.1) 0.41 (0.08)
Price indexation ιp beta 0.500 (0.150) 0.26 (0.08) 0.28 (0.07)
Capacity util. beta 0.500 (0.150) 0.59 (0.1) 0.43 (0.07)
1+Fix. cost
Y
= 1 + λp norm 1.250 (0.125) 1.64 (0.08) 1.94 (0.05)
Taylor rule infl. ψ1 norm 1.500 (0.250) 2 (0.17) 1.63 (0.18)
same, smoothing ρR beta 0.750 (0.100) 0.82 (0.02) 0.92 (0.02)
same, LR gap ψ2 norm 0.125 (0.050) 0.09 (0.02) 0.13 (0.03)
same, SR gap ψ3 norm 0.125 (0.050) 0.24 (0.03) 0.2 (0.02)
Mean inflation (data) gamm 0.625 (0.100) 0.76 (0.09) 0.58 (0.08)
100×time pref. gamm 0.250 (0.100) 0.16 (0.05) 0.12 (0.04)
Mean hours (data) norm 0.000 (2.000) 1.07 (0.95) 0.04 (0.69)
Trend (μ− 1) ∗ 100 norm 0.400 (0.100) 0.43 (0.02) 0.48 (0.01)
Capital share α norm 0.300 (0.050) 0.19 (0.02) 0.24 (0.01)
Gov. adj. cost S ′′g (μ) norm 0.000 (0.500) n/a 7.11 (1.09)
Budget bal speed ψτ−0.025
0.175
beta 0.25 (0.1637) n/a 0.05 (0.04)
Mean gov. debt norm 0.000 (0.500) n/a -0.16 (0.51)
Mean bond spread gamm 0.500 (0.100) n/a 0.47 (0.04)
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Table 8: Estimation, part 2
Prior Prior mean (s.d.) SW Model Our Model
66:1-08:4 49:2-08:4
s.d. tech. invg 0.100 (2.000) 0.46 (0.03) 0.47 (0.02)
AR(1) tech. beta 0.500 (0.200) 0.95 (0.01) 0.95 (0.01)
s.d. bond invg 0.100 (2.000) 0.24 (0.03) 0.95 (0.04)
AR(1) bond ρq beta 0.500 (0.200) 0.27 (0.1) 0.67 (0.03)
s.d. gov’t invg 0.100 (2.000) 0.54 (0.03) 0.36 (0.02)
AR(1) gov’t beta 0.500 (0.200) 0.98 (0.01) 0.98 (0.01)
Cov(gov’t, tech.) norm 0.500 (0.250) 0.53 (0.09) 0.3 (0.04)
s.d. inv. price invg 0.100 (2.000) 0.43 (0.04) 1.25 (0.1)
AR(1) inv. price beta 0.500 (0.200) 0.73 (0.06) 0.56 (0.06)
s.d. mon. pol. invg 0.100 (2.000) 0.24 (0.02) 0.22 (0.01)
AR(1) mon. pol. beta 0.500 (0.200) 0.16 (0.07) 0.22 (0.05)
s.d. goods m-up invg 0.100 (2.000) 0.14 (0.01) 0.32 (0.02)
AR(1) goods m-up beta 0.500 (0.200) 0.89 (0.04) 0.91 (0.05)
MA(1) goods m-up beta 0.500 (0.200) 0.73 (0.08) 0.96 (0.02)
s.d. wage m-up invg 0.100 (2.000) 0.26 (0.02) 0.23 (0.02)
AR(1) wage m-up beta 0.500 (0.200) 0.97 (0.01) 0.97 (0.01)
MA(1) wage m-up beta 0.500 (0.200) 0.91 (0.03) 0.92 (0.02)
s.d. Tax shock invg 0.100 (2.000) n/a 1.44 (0.08)
AR(1) tax shock beta 0.500 (0.200) n/a 0.98 (0.01)
s.d. gov. inv. price invg 0.100 (2.000) n/a 0.79 (0.08)
AR(1) gov. inv. price beta 0.500 (0.200) n/a 0.97 (0.01)
s.d. bond spread invg 0.100 (2.000) n/a 0.08 (0)
AR(1) bond spread beta 0.500 (0.200) n/a 0.91 (0.02)
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